In this work we look at multiple agents that represent different self-interested real world parties in electronic commerce. We study all phases of electronic commerce: agent-based marketing; searching for consumers, producers and products; discount seeking via coalition formation; automated negotiation and bargaining; contract parameter optimization; contract execution; and agent-based followup.
We have developed a method for carrying out exchanges without enforcement. This is important in ecommerce where external enforcement may not be guaranteed.
We have done considerable work on the bargaining phase of electronic commerce, and the partner finding phase; see also Coalition Formation, Negotiation among Computationally Bounded Self-interested Agents, and Automated Contracting.
Questions about this research may be directed to sandholm@cs.wustl.edu.Sandholm, T. 1998. Contract Types for Satisficing Task Allocation: I Theoretical Results, AAAI Spring Symposium Series: Satisficing Models, Sanford University, Stanford, CA, March 23-25.
Andersson, M and Sandholm, T. 1998. Contract Types for Satisficing Task Allocation: II Experimental Results, AAAI Spring Symposium Series: Satisficing Models, Sanford University, Stanford, CA, March 23-25.
Sandholm, T. 1997. Unenforced Ecommerce Transactions. IEEE Internet Computing, Nov-Dec, Special issue on Internet Economics.
Sandholm, T. and Lesser, V. 1997. Issues in Automated Negotiation and Electronic Commerce: Extending the Contract Net Framework. In Readings in Agents, Huhns, M. and Singh, M. (eds.), Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, October.
Sandholm, T. 1996. Limitations of the Vickrey Auction in Computational Multiagent Systems. Second International Conference on Multiagent Systems (ICMAS-96), Keihanna Plaza, Kyoto, Japan, December, pp. 299-306. (Acceptance rate 28%)
Sandholm, T. and Lesser, V. 1996. Advantages of a Leveled Commitment Contracting Protocol. Thirteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-96), Portland, OR, pp. 126-133. (Acceptance rate 31%)